Do auditors objectively evaluate their subordinates' work?

In this study, we investigate whether audit managers' assessment of the qua lity of work their subordinates perform is influenced by the managers' prio r impressions of these subordinates, and whether managers whom the firm con siders outstanding are less susceptible to such an effect. We conduct an ex periment using actual audit senior-manager teams. Each senior and manager p articipating in the experiment has been classified by his or her firm as ei ther outstanding or average. Each manager is paired with two audit seniors (one outstanding senior and one average senior), and each evaluates the mem os written by his or her paired seniors. Managers evaluate the quality of t he memos twice: (1) first, with the identities of the seniors indicated on the memos, and (2) later, when the seniors' identities are not explicitly r evealed. Results show that average managers evaluate memos written by outst anding seniors more favorably than those written by average seniors when th ey know the identities of the memos' authors, but not when the identities o f the seniors are not revealed. Outstanding managers do not appear suscepti ble to this effect.