The argument that automatic processes are responsible for affective/evaluat
ive priming effects has been primarily based on studies that have manipulat
ed the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA; i.e., the interval between the onset
of the prime and the onset of the target). Moreover, these SOA studies pro
vide an insight in the time course of the activation processes underlying a
utomatic affect/attitude activation. Based on a fine-grained manipulation o
f the SOA employing either the evaluative decision task (Experiment 1) and
the pronunciation task (Experiment 2) we concluded that affective priming,
and hence automatic affect activation, is based on fast-acting automatic pr
ocesses. The results of Experiment 3 provide a valid explanation for an app
arent discrepancy between the results of Experiments 1 and 2 and previous f
indings. Finally, the results of Experiment 3 support the prediction of Jar
vis and Petty (1996) that affective priming effects should be stronger for
participants who are more chronically engaged in conscious evaluations.