REAL SELF-DECEPTION

Self-deception is made unnecessarily puzzling by the assumption that i t is an intrapersonal analog of ordinary interpersonal deception. In p aradigmatic cases, interpersonal deception is intentional and that the self-deceiver believes that some proposition is true while also belie ving that it is false produces interesting conceptual puzzles, but it also produces a fundamentally mistaken view of the dynamics of self-de ception. This target article challenges the assumption and presents an alternative view of the nature and etiology of self-deception. Drawin g upon empirical studies of cognitive biases, it resolves familiar ''p aradoxes'' about the dynamics of self-deception and the condition of b eing self-deceived. Conceptually sufficient conditions for self-decept ion are offered and putative empirical demonstrations of a kind of sel f-deception in which a subject believes that a proposition is true whi le also believing that it is false are criticized. Self-deception is n either irresolvably paradoxical nor mysterious, and it is explicable w ithout the assistance of mental exotica. The key to understanding its dynamics is a proper appreciation of our capacity for acquiring and re taining motivationally biased beliefs.