We present threshold DSS (digital signature standard) signatures where the
power to sign is shared by n players such that for a given parameter t < n/
2 any subset of 2t + 1 signers can collaborate to produce a valid DSS signa
ture on any given message, but no subset of t corrupted players can forge a
signature tin particular, cannot learn the signature key). In addition, we
present a robust threshold DSS scheme that can also tolerate n/3 payers wh
o refuse to participate in the signature protocol. We can also endure n/4 m
aliciously faulty players that generate incorrect partial signatures at the
time of signature computation. This results in a highly secure and resilie
nt DSS signature system applicable to the protection of the secret signatur
e key, the prevention of forgery, and increased system availability. Assumi
ng that secret communication between the players is available, we prove the
security of our protocols solely based on the hardness of forging a regula
r DSS signature. (C) 2001 Academic Press.