Communication, fiction and the expression of subjectivity

The expression of subjectivity, though it is by no means confined to fictio n, has mostly been studied in the fictional discourse. One of its expressio ns is the so called represented speech and thought (RST), which has been wi dely discussed by Banfield. Her major thesis is that, in a given RST uttera nce, the subjectivity of no more than one subject of consciousness can be e xpressed. This has been contested, notably by Ducrot. In this paper, I comp are RST with two other ways of reporting speech, namely direct discourse an d indirect discourse. I focus on singular personal pronouns and their use i n reporting subjectivity and I conclude that the pronouns used to designate the subject of consciousness in a RST utterance-whether they are or not th ird person pronouns-are very similar in both their function and their inter pretation to the first person in speech. However, given that first person p ronouns in the same sentence can be used to designate the subject of consci ousness in a RST utterance-whether they are or not third person pronouns-ar e very similar in both their function and their interpretation to the first person in speech. However, given that first person pronouns in the same se ntence can be used to designate distinct individuals, Banfield's claim that there can be no more than one subject of consciousness in a given RST sent ence does not seem to hold. What is more, contrary to her claims, there can be RST utterances where the subject of consciousness is represented by the first or second person pronouns, which means that RST is a means of commun ication. Finally, the expression of subjectivity, far from being restricted to fiction, is merely the manifestation of a general cognitive tendency in humanity: the intentional stance.