PURPOSE: We examined whether physician factors, particularly financial prod
uctivity incentives, affect the provision of preventive care.
SUBJECTS AND METHODS: We surveyed and reviewed the charts of 4,473 patients
who saw 1 of 169 internists from 11 academically affiliated primary care p
ractices in Boston. We abstracted cancer risk factors, comorbid conditions,
and the dates of the last Papanicolaou (Pap) smear, mammogram, cholesterol
screening, and influenza vaccination. We obtained physician information in
cluding the method of financial compensation through a mailed physician sur
vey. We used multivariable logistic regression to examine the association b
etween physician factors and four outcomes based on Health Plan Employer Da
ta and Information Set (HEDIS) measures: (1) Pap smear within the prior 3 y
ears among women 20 to 75 years old; (2) mammogram in the prior 2 years amo
ng women 52 to 69 years old; (3) cholesterol screening within the prior 5 y
ears among patients 40 to 64 years old; and (4) influenza vaccination among
patients 65 years old and older. All analyses accounted for clustering by
provider and site and were converted into adjusted rates.
RESULTS: After adjustment for practice site, clinical, and physician factor
s, patients cared for by physicians with financial productivity incentives
were significantly less likely than those cared for by physicians without t
his incentive to receive Pap smears (rate difference, 12%; 95% confidence i
nterval [CI]: 5% to 18%) and cholesterol screening (rate difference, 4%; 95
% CI: 0% to 8%). Financial incentives were not significantly associated wit
h rates of mammography (rate difference, -3%; 95% CI: -15% to 10%) or influ
enza vaccination (rate difference, -13%; 95% CI: -28% to 2%).
CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that some financial productivity incentiv
es may discourage the performance of certain forms of preventive care, Spec
ifically Pap smears and cholesterol screening. More studies are needed to e
xamine the effects of financial incentives on the quality of care, and to e
xamine whether quality improvement interventions or incentives based on qua
lity improve the performance of preventive care. (C)2001 by Excerpta Medica
, Inc.