'The less I trust, the less I contribute (or not)?' The effects of trust, accountability and self-monitoring in social dilemmas

The present research examined the influence of trust, accountability: and s elf-monitoring on individual decision makers' willingness to contribute in a give-some game and in an experimental public goods dilemma. Previous rese arch has shown that trust and contributions are positively related such tha t high trusters generally contribute move than low trusters. The present re search questions the pervasiveness of this relation by arguing that low tru sters may increase their contributions to the same level as those of high t rusters, but only under circumstances where their decisions are highly iden tifiable to their interaction partner(s). Both studies showed that strong p erceptions of trust, high accountability and high self-monitoring influence d contributions positively in line with predictions, individuals low in tru st contributed up to the same level as high trusters when accountability wa s high rather than loin Moreover, this interaction between trust and accoun tability was only: found among those classified as high self-monitors. Our results suggest that the well-known positive relation between trust and con tributions may take a different form when situational cues and individual p redispositions are taken into account. Copyright (C) 2001 John Wiley & Sons , Ltd.