A model of inductive inquiry is defined within a first-order context. Intui
tively, the model pictures inquiry as a game between Nature and a scientist
. To begin the game, a nonlogical vocabulary is agreed upon by the two play
ers along with a partition of a class of structures for that vocabulary. Ne
xt, Nature secretly chooses one structure (the real world) from some cell o
f the partition. She then presents the scientist with a sequence of atomic
facts about the chosen structure. With each new datum the scientist announc
es a guess about the cell to which the chosen structure belongs. To succeed
in his inquiry, the scientists successive conjectures must be correct all
but finitely often, that is, the conjectures must converge in the limit to
the correct cell. A special kind of scientist selects his hypotheses on the
basis of a belief revision operator. We show that reliance on belief revis
ion allows scientists to solve a wide class of problems.