Facts, concepts, and theories: The shape of psychology's epistemic triangle

In this essay we introduce the idea of an epistemic triangle, with factual, theoretical, and conceptual investigations at its vertices, and argue that whereas scientific progress requires a balance among the three types of in vestigations, psychology's epistemic triangle is stretched disproportionate ly in the direction of factual investigations. Expressed by a variety of di fferent problems, this unbalance may be created by a main operative theme-t he obsession of psychology with a narrow and mechanical view of the scienti fic method and a misguided aversion to conceptual inquiries. Hence, to redr ess psychology's epistemic triangle, a broader and more realistic conceptio n of method is needed and, in particular, conceptual investigations must be promoted. Using examples from different research domains, we describe the nature of conceptual investigations, relate them to theoretical investigati ons, and illustrate their purposes, forms, and limitations.