Agency, rationality and social policy

The recent concern to develop a radical but critical account of agency in s ocial policy is to be welcomed. However this article questions whether the work of A. Giddens can provide an adequate foundation for such a project. G iddens's account of the welfare subject contains several weaknesses. It is voluntaristic and yet paradoxically it cannot offer an adequate understandi ng of radical change, It is also rationalistic and assumes the existences o f a unitary and knowledgeable subject. As a consequence there is a danger t hat social policy develops a lop-sided model of agency which is insufficien tly sensitive to the passionate, tragic and contradictory dimensions of hum an experience. A robust account of the active welfare subject must be prepa red to confront the real experiences of powerlessness and psychic injury wh ich result from injustice and oppression and acknowledge human capacities f or destructiveness towards self and others. Only by exploring these differe nt subject positions - victim, 'own worst enemy' and creative, reflexive ag ent - can we develop an understanding of the welfare subject which is optim istic without being naive.