Cognitivist reversal and theories of consciousness

In this article the A. takes into account the particular relationship withi n contemporary cognitive science between theories of consciousness and theo ries of intentionality, in the sense that the problem of consciousness has become a side-issue in the study of intentional processes in cognitive syst ems. These processes are formalised in terms of computational procedures wh ich define their own semantical environment(intentional content) and their own goals(intentional directedness). Through the study of some recent works within cognitive science, the A. shows that the identification of a theore tical model of intentionality does not depend solely on scientific criteria , but allows for different interpretations of intentionality to subsist wit hin cognitive science. Acknowledging this fact, the A. shows how the relian ce of the intentional operations upon a representational and a functional c ontext implies a criticism of reductionism, without reproducing a dualism b etween conscious experience on the one hand and computational mechanisms on the other.