WHY VOTERS MAY PREFER CONGESTED PUBLIC CLUBS

Citation
A. Glazer et E. Niskanen, WHY VOTERS MAY PREFER CONGESTED PUBLIC CLUBS, Journal of public economics, 65(1), 1997, pp. 37-44
Citations number
5
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ISSN journal
00472727
Volume
65
Issue
1
Year of publication
1997
Pages
37 - 44
Database
ISI
SICI code
0047-2727(1997)65:1<37:WVMPCP>2.0.ZU;2-A
Abstract
Governmental facilities for such services as education, health, and tr ansportation are often small, of poor quality, and overcrowded, even w hen the costs are spread among all taxpayers. We also find that govern ments may subsidize private facilities providing the same services, or may charge admission fees at public facilities. We explain these phen omena with a model which considers two types of people, rich and poor. A majority consisting of poor people may purposely build small and lo w quality facilities to discourage use by the rich, thereby lowering t axes. For the same reason, the poor may benefit from an admission fee at public clubs, or even from a subsidy to private clubs they do not u se.