Eastern enlargement of the EU is a central pillar in Europe's post-Col
d War architecture. Keeping the eastern countries out seriously endang
ers their economic transition, and economic failure in the east could
threaten peace and prosperity in western Europe. The perceived economi
c costs and benefits will dictate the enlargement's timing. There are
four parts to the calculus - the costs and the benefits in the east an
d in the west. Here we break new ground in estimating the economic ben
efits of enlargement for east and west using simulations in a global a
pplied general equilibrium model. Our analysis includes a scenario in
which joining the EU significantly reduces the risk premium on investm
ent in the east - with resulting huge benefits to the new entrants. We
also review the existing literature on the EU budget costs and arrive
at a surprisingly well-determined 'consensus' estimate, which we supp
ort with a new political economy analysis of the budget. The bottom li
ne is unambiguous and strongly positive: enlargement is a very good de
al for both the EU incumbents and the new members.