Addressing discrepancies between values and behavior: The motivating effect of reasons

Based on the values-as-truisms hypothesis (Maio & Olson, 1998), two experim ents tested whether the salience of reasons for a value increases provalue behavior over and above the effect of making the value salient. In the firs t experiment, we predicted and found that participants who contemplated the ir reasons regarding the value of equality subsequently behaved in a more e galitarian manner in a minimal group paradigm than participants whose value of equality was primed. In the second experiment, participants who contemp lated their reasons regarding the value of helpfulness subsequently behaved in a more helpful manner than participants who had rated their positive fe elings about the value. Overall, these results support a novel explanation for the value-behavior discrepancies that have been revealed in classic res earch (e.g., Darley & Batson, 1973). (C) 2001 Academic Press.