The problem of explaining the growth of knowledge has a long history among
philosophers. David Hume rejected a logic of knowledge amplification and of
fered a psychological, rather than a logical, solution. Hume's naturalistic
account can be made more powerful and precise by adopting the principles o
f contemporary learning theory. Until recently, however, a behavioral accou
nt of knowledge amplification could not account for the differential gains
in knowledge seen across species. We argue that recent empirical and theore
tical developments in the behavioral analyses of language and cognition add
to previously developed behavioral principles in a way that allows for a f
uller account of knowledge amplification as it applies to interspecies diff
erences. The role of stimulus equivalence and other derived relational resp
onding and their role in knowledge amplification is described. Relational F
rame Theory is offered as an organizing structure for understanding the way
s in which relational stimulus control impacts the growth of knowledge. (C)
2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.