Capturing qualia: higher-order concepts and connectionism

Antireductionist philosophers have argued for higher-order classifications of qualia that locate consciousness outside the scope of conventional scien tific explanations, viz., by classifying qualia as intrinsic, basic, or sub jective properties, antireductionists distinguish qualia from extrinsic, co mplex, and objective properties, and thereby distinguish conscious mental s tates from the possible explananda of functionalist or physicalist explanat ions. I argue that, in important respects, qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties of conscious mental states, and that, contrary to an tireductionists' suggestions, these higher-order classifications are compat ible with qualia reduction. I demonstrate this compatibility by examining t he putative higher-order properties of qualia and comparing them to the hig her-order properties characteristic of connectionist networks approximate ( in intertheoretic terms) the putative higher-order properties of qualia suf ficiently well to conclude that qualia reductionism can (1) accommodate cla ims that qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties, and (2) ex plain the motivating intuitions for those claims generated by inverted, abs ent, and alien qualia thought experiments. In this way I argue that (approx imate versions of) the putative higher-order classifications of qualia not only fail to defeat qualia reduction but, ironically, turn out to support i t.