Support for the progressively finer attributes theory: Two experiments

Authors
Citation
J. Coll et R. Coll, Support for the progressively finer attributes theory: Two experiments, PSYCHOL REP, 88(1), 2001, pp. 203-225
Citations number
18
Categorie Soggetti
Psycology
Journal title
PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS
ISSN journal
00332941 → ACNP
Volume
88
Issue
1
Year of publication
2001
Pages
203 - 225
Database
ISI
SICI code
0033-2941(200102)88:1<203:SFTPFA>2.0.ZU;2-D
Abstract
In this paper two experiments support and amplify Coil and Cell's 1994 Prog ressively Finer Attributes Theory of Memory Trace Development. Important to the current paper are five propositions of this theory. (1) The memory tra ce develops along an attribute dimension from coarse/general to fine/specif ic attributes. (2) Forgetting is a reverse movement from fine to coarse as increasingly less fine attributes are lost. (3) A memory trace consists of a bundle of defining attributes and relating attributes. There are no const raints on the type of attribute included in the attribute bundle or in the order of types acquired. The trace name is defined by the attribute bundle it represents. (4) Access to any defining attribute of a memory trace gives full access to all other attributes of the trace bundle. (5) In the early phases of trace development the attributes are preeminent in recall bur, as familiarity with a to-be-learned item increases, the attributes become inc reasingly cohesive and the name assumes preeminence. As forgetting progress es, there is a return to the original state (attributes are preeminent). Ex p. 1 supports Propositions 3 and 4 and Exp. 2 supports Propositions 3 and 5 . Both experiments provide validation of Propositions 1 and 2 beyond that i n prior work. The authors present arguments that the coarse-to-fine movemen t of the Progressively Finer Attributes Theory is the mechanism by which Le vels of Processing operates.