Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness

Most 'theories of consciousness' are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis fo r a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness shoul d provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states - the processes underlying introsp ection. This can be achieved through the construction of information-proces sing models that can account for 'Type-C' processes. Type-C processes can b e specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of t he stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) fr amework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions . Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the invest igation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our appro ach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issue s associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues conce rns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.