If we assume that consciousness is a natural biological phenomenon in the b
rain, should we expect the current brain sensing and imaging methods to som
ehow 'discover' consciousness? The answer depends on the following points:
What kind of level of biological organization do we assume consciousness to
be? What would count as the discovery of this level? What are the levels o
f organization from which the currently available research instruments pick
signals and acquire data? Single-cell recordings, PET fMRI, EEG and MEG pi
ck different types of signals from different levels of organization in the
brain. However it seems they do not manage to pick signals that would allow
the direct visualization and reconstruction of the higher levels of electr
ophysiological or,organization that are crucial for the empirical discovery
and theoretical explanation of consciousness. The message of the present p
aper is twofold: On the one hand, we should be aware of the practical limit
ations of the currently available methods of cognitive neuroscience and not
read too much into the images produced by them. On the other hand, the pre
sent limitations could be overcome by more sophisticated methods in the fut
ure. Therefore, contrary to what several philosophers have argued the empir
ical discovery of consciousness in the brain is not impossible in principle
.