Mixing carrots with sticks: Evaluating the effectiveness of positive incentives

Authors
Citation
H. Dorussen, Mixing carrots with sticks: Evaluating the effectiveness of positive incentives, J PEACE RES, 38(2), 2001, pp. 251-262
Citations number
15
Categorie Soggetti
Politucal Science & public Administration
Journal title
JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH
ISSN journal
00223433 → ACNP
Volume
38
Issue
2
Year of publication
2001
Pages
251 - 262
Database
ISI
SICI code
0022-3433(200103)38:2<251:MCWSET>2.0.ZU;2-2
Abstract
Several recent studies argue that positive incentives have become important policy instruments allowing states to meet their post-Cold War security ch allenges. The leading research question is the effectiveness and efficiency of incentives relative to (economic) sanctions. Whereas earlier work often treated incentives merely as weak sanctions, these studies present a theor etical perspective in which incentives become powerful instruments to turn conflict into cooperation. The essay is constructed around four major issue s: (1) the comparison of the effectiveness of incentives and sanctions, (2) the identification of conditions under which incentives are effective, (3) the use of the comparative case studies method to test these conditions, a nd (4) the identification of policy implications. A principal argument in t his essay is that incentives need to be distinguished very carefully from s anctions. Moreover, none of the studies derives the conditions under which we expect incentives to matter more than sanctions. The books are good exam ples of both the strengths and weaknesses of the comparative case studies m ethod. Expert knowledge provides valuable insight into the various cases, b ut lack of logical and inferential constraint remains a problem. Neverthele ss, the studies offer important policy lessons for the successful implement ation of incentives. This essay suggests various ways in which research on sanctions and incentives could progress. In particular, older work by Knorr (1975) already proposes how sanctions and incentives can be distinguished. Finally it is indicated how selection bias could have been avoided.