From Kosovo to Kursk: Russian defense policy from Yeltsin to Putin

Civilian control of the armed forces is an essential element in the democra tization of formerly authoritarian or totalitarian states. Yet Russia has f ailed to achieve such control either under Yeltsin or under Vladimir Putin, its current president. This failure endangers both Russian democracy and R ussian security as it creates auspicious conditions for continuing domestic authoritarianism and internal war at home as well as foreign adventurism. This article traces the consequences of that lack of democratic civilian co ntrol in the Russian armed forces from the Kosovo descent of mid-1999 until the tragic sinking of the Kursk submarine in August 2000. It assesses the reason behind the Kosovo operation as well as the Chechen war that began Au gust-September 1999. Despite the undoubted Chechen threat, this war goes fa r beyond a riposte to that threat. Indeed, it reflects all of the pathologi es inherent in the failure to achieve democratization and it has contribute d as well to the hardening of Russia's posture vis-a-vis the West and to th e failure to achieve democratic reform in the armed forces. Until and unles s Russia overcomes those impediments to reform, it will be internally anti- democratic or incompletely democratic, prone to military adventures, and an ti-Western in its overall security policies.