Turkey's recent success in dealing with the threat of political Islam witho
ut the military taking power into its own hands cannot be explained by eith
er of the two contending theories about the military's role in the consolid
ation of democracy, that of the "mode-of-transition" or that of "electoral
dynamics." Following the transition to democracy, officers in Latin America
have evinced politically elite characteristics and have been in a tug of w
ar with civilian politicians; officers in Eastern Europe have shown non-eli
te (professional) characteristics and have been subordinated to civilian po
liticians; officers in Turkey, not unlike their counterparts in France and
Germany of earlier decades, have displayed state-elite characteristics and
maintained their privileged position in the polity. Thus, while it is possi
ble to use the dichotomy of politicized versus professional militaries to e
xplain the fortunes of democracy in Latin America and Eastern Europe, respe
ctively, in Turkey it is necessary to analyze the factors determining the o
rientation of officers toward democracy.