In this paper, we examine the viability of cooperative policies oriented to
the resolution of transboundary pollution problems using the theory of pri
vate provision of public goods in a two-country model. We analyze the effec
ts on economic welfare of voluntary technological transfers oriented to red
ucing the emission of pollutants.
Our analysis shows that when the atmosphere is taken as a pure public goods
, "a strong paradox'' emerges: the advanced country, in spite of the transf
er, sees its economic welfare improved while the developing country sees it
worsen. Moreover, if both a technical and an income transfer occur, this p
aradox might not be solved. Furthermore, "a paradoxical improvement'' occur
s when the advanced country does not take any policy towards the environmen
t but the developing country does: an improvement in the level of technolog
y in the developing country allows for an expansion of the level of utility
in both countries. On the other hand, in the case where the atmosphere is
taken as an impure public goods, when both countries pursue an abatement po
licy, the transfer of technology leads to an improvement in welfare in both
countries.