The caliber of recent discourse regarding genetically modified organisms (G
MOs) has suffered from a lack of consensus on terminology, from the scarcit
y of evidence upon which to assess risk to health and to the environment, a
nd from value differences between proponents and opponents of GMOs. Towards
addressing these issues, we present the thesis that GM should be defined a
s the forcible insertion of DNA into a host genome, irrespective of the sou
rce of the DNA, and exclusive of conventional or mutation breeding.
Some defenders of the commercial use of GMOs have referred to the scientifi
c work of GMO critics as "junk science.'' Such a claim is false and mislead
ing, given that many papers critical of both the utility and safety of GMOs
have been published in peer reviewed journals by respected scientists. In
contrast, there is a dearth of peer reviewed work to substantiate the frequ
ently heard assertions of either safety or utility in GMOs. The polarity, w
hich now characterizes much of the public discourse on GMOs, reflects not s
imply scientific disagreement, but also disagreement in underlying value as
sumptions. Value differences strongly affect the assessment of both benefit
and harm from GMOs.
The concept of substantial equivalence occupies a pivotal position in the G
MO risk assessment process that is used in both Canada and the US. A GMO ju
dged to be substantially equivalent to a conventional product - as have all
submissions to date - is presumed to be safe enough for commercialization.
The conclusion of safety - from both human health and environmental perspe
ctives - should be based on scientific evidence, corroborated by actual exp
erimentation. However, regulators infer safety largely from assumptions-bas
ed reasoning, with little or no experimental validation. The judgement of s
afety because of substantial equivalence is a dubious argument by analogy.