The authors suggest a theory that predicts how summary evaluations about ta
rgets are implicitly formed and stored in memory and under which conditions
they are used in attitude judgment. First, it is assumed that the mere enc
oding of value-charged stimuli is a sufficient condition to initiate implic
it online formation of summary evaluations. Second, the authors claim that
this process is summative. Accordingly, the intensities of the positive or
negative responses evoked by the stimuli in the organism are thought to be
accumulated and stored in a unitary memory structure. This hypothetical str
ucture is called value account. Third, it is assumed that a value account i
s more easily accessible in memory than are concrete traces of past experie
nces. Therefore, attitude judgments should rely on value accounts, especial
ly if cognitive capacities are constrained (e.g., due to time pressure). Th
ree experiments that provide converging evidence for the value-account appr
oach are reported.