Federalism, individual rights, and the conditional spending conundrum

The conditional spending power or the ability of Congress and the executive to attach conditions to grants in aid and entitlement programs, has become a vital source of authority to monitor and regulate the activites of both the states and individual citizens. If there were meaningful political or l egal limits upon the conditional spending power, it would be no more proble matic than any of the other policy mechanisms available for achieving Feder al ends, but such limits presently do not exist. As a consequence, conditio nal aid may function to promote state sovereignty and the rights of citizen ship, but it also may serve to undermine them. Contrary to recent developme nts ostensibly limiting the reach of Federal regulatory authority, arguably coercive and even unconstitutional applications of conditional aid are sup ported and encouraged by both the federal judiciary and contemporary politi cs. This article explains how and why this is the case, and assesses prospe cts for reform.