Jung's (1928/1988) radical revision of Freud's libido theory is critically
reviewed here with a focus on its cogency, rather than historical context,
identifying its convergence with gestalt field theory and the relational co
ncept of mind. Jung was aware of a tension between his 'pure' concept of ps
ychic energy and the 'applied' concept, already established in clinical pra
ctice. Today the latter is familiar, though objectionable on scientific and
philosophical grounds, whilst Jung's arguably persuasive thesis is virtual
ly unknown. Jung contended that energy is not a force, the functional conte
xt of behaviour is a closed system of psychological values, and therefore l
ibido is not substance or desire. His proposal for applying the concept in
psychology, especially regarding symbol formation, is less successful, reit
erating the metaphor of libidinal how. Parallels between Jung's thesis and
current debates concerning the ontological status of information and inform
ational processes are pointed out.