In many historical cases, victory by a challenger for political dominance o
ver an initially dominant group has ended civil conflict. But in other plac
es, victory by a challenger has provided only a temporary respite, a brief
intermission before the resumption of civil conflict. This article uses a t
heoretical model of civil conflict to identify the factors that determine w
hether civil conflict is ended or never ending. This theory focuses on how
the values that rival groups attach to political dominance relate to each o
ther and to the technology of conflict. These relations determine whether t
here is civil conflict and, if there is civil conflict. whether civil confl
ict ends whenever the initial challenger group becomes politically dominant
or whether civil conflict is never ending. For example, the authors find t
hat for civil conflict to be never ending, the ratio of values attached to
political dominance can be neither too large nor too small. The implication
s of the theory seem to be consistent with the evolution of 20th-century ci
vil conflicts in such diverse places as Russia, China, Iran, South Africa,
the Balkans, Israel/Palestine, and many parts of central Africa.