A model that integrates production, exchange, and conflict is used to theor
etically investigate the economic behavior of groups that experience an ero
sion of security within a state. The focus of our investigation is the comp
arative effects of different conflict production functions (i.e., ratio and
logistic) and parameters (i.e., weapons productivity, conflict decisivenes
s) on the predictions of the integrated economy model. The model shows how
two major analytical categories of mainstream economics-production and exch
ange-can be a source of demand for arms as groups attempt to protect their
economic opportunities in the face of intrastate insecurity. Conditions are
also identified under which the gains from specialized production and exch
ange dampen the potential for conflict and hence serve as a form of conflic
t mitigation. Many of the results of the integrated model are shown to be q
uite sensitive to the technology of conflict.