On the structure of the core of balanced games

The uniform competitive solutions (u.c.s.) are basically stable sets of pro posals involving several coalitions which are not necessarily disjoint. In the general framework: of NTU games, the uniform competitive solutions have been defined in two earlier papers of the author (Stefanescu [5]) and Stef anescu [6]). The general existence results cover most situations formalized in the framework of the cooperative game theory, including those when the coalitional function is allowed to have empty values. The present approach concerns the situation when the coalition configuratio ns are balanced. One shows, that if the coalitional function has nonempty v alues, the game admits balanced u.c.s. To each u.c.s. one associated an "id eal payoff vector" representing the utilities that the coalitions promis to the players. One proves that if the game is balanced, then the core and th e strong core consist of the ideal payoff vectors associated to all balance d u.c.s.