The Sino-US agreement regarding China's accession to the World Trade Organi
zation (WTO) in late 1999 came as a surprise to many observers. How and who
did the Chinese reach the agreement in view of the impasses in the negotia
tion that occurred earlier in the year? These impasses included the collaps
e of the WTO talks during Zhu's visit to the USA in April, the NATO bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May, and the deadlock between the Ch
inese and US negotiators in November. Drawing on published sources as well
as experts' insights, this paper examines the Chinese leadership's decision
-making process and its reasons for concluding the agreement. It suggests t
hat the exclusive decision-making circle of top Chinese leaders circumvente
d the opposition to the agreement and facilitated the negotiations. These l
eaders, especially Jiang and Zhu, favoured an agreement because they believ
ed WTO membership could improve China's international relations, trade cond
itions, the outcomes of reform at home, and China's leverage over Taiwan. T
he closed decision making on the WTO also left the Chinese leaders with a c
hallenging task: educating officials and the population about the WTO rules
and possible impacts while ensuring that they abide by the rules.