Neuroimages, which may appear to be deceptively similar to photographs
of a person's brain, have been used as evidence in court cases to sup
port psychiatric diagnosis. These images are scientific evidence, and
courts should evaluate the admissibility of such evidence under Dauber
t v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. But psychiatric evaluations of
a person's mental state are ''soft'' science, which may or may not be
evaluated as scientific evidence. When a psychiatrist's testimony make
s reference to ''hard'' science evidence such as neuroimages, there is
a danger of undue prejudice because the finder of fact may be confuse
d. In this note, Jennifer Kulynych describes this problem and proposes
a two-pronged evidentiary standard as a solution. She suggests that c
ourts evaluate the hard science aspects of neuroimaging evidence under
established doctrine, and evaluate the soft science evidence under a
social science framework. Given the current state of psychiatric neuro
imaging research, Ms. Kulynych concludes that the amount of neuroimagi
ng evidence admitted under her proposed standard would appropriately b
e quite small.