The revolution in military affairs (RMA) has at some levels made it easier
and more attractive to deploy armed forces to change the course of internat
ional conflicts. RMA has also facilitated a concealment of the role and mea
ning of politics when using force. The article departs from this observatio
n through an analysis of interaction between politics and military force du
ring military operations, with two main perspectives: 'all or nothing' and
'limited war'. Building on this foundation, the author then proceeds to an
analysis of various military strategies in conflicts, and the form of inter
action between political and military considerations they underscore. Contr
asting these theoretical orientations with how political actors debated the
use of armed forces an Bosnia and Kosovo, he draws two conclusions: a lack
of understanding of how important a policy is when using force, and, secon
dly, the mere presence of political goals is not enough to increase operati
onal efficiency. It is also important that stated goals are achievable thro
ugh the military strategies, and that the conclusions eventually unfolding
from the chosen military strategy, are politically acceptable.