The validity of artificial situations is often questioned, and particularly
so the possibility of transfer of findings to the real world. Such questio
ns, or doubts, may stem from a rigid distinction between real and artificia
l situations or from too strict a notion of representation. This article wi
ll argue that 'the real world' does not provide unambiguous criteria for re
presentation and that, moreover, many experiments and simulation games do n
ot have to represent 'the real world' in any direct way. Both issues are us
ually treated under the heading of external validity, which means complianc
e to conventions that dominated thinking about validity over decades. These
conventions need to be reconsidered. Quality standards for research must n
ot be rigid, nor should be applied in a way that ignores the characteristic
s of a particular research project. Fixed notions about validity may preven
t a researcher from adapting validation procedures to the circumstances at
hand. The article takes issue with a conception of external validity as sur
face resemblance between artificial and real situations, advocates an activ
e, non-routine approach to validity questions, and encourages individual re
searchers to develop a line of reasoning on these questions instead of adhe
ring to standards that may not suit their particular research.