The purpose of this article is to show that (i) representational assumption
s play a key role for any psychological theory and that (ii) their elaborat
ion leads to the foundation of an interdisciplinary psychology which is con
sidered a discipline of neuroscience. The basic logic underlying this appro
ach is characterized by the necessity to define representational assumption
s as explicitely as possible and to evaluate their plausibility or empirica
l validity whenever feasible. Thus, when pursuing the representational prob
lem, it is a logical consequence to focus also on the biological basis of p
sychological processes. In an attempt to demonstrate this interdisciplinary
perspective, representational assumptions of memory theories are discussed
as an example. An interesting phenomenon which nicely demonstrates this cl
ose link between representational assumptions and neuronal processes is the
unrealistic paradox of retrieval interference which can be derived from tr
aditional memory models. It predicts that the more information is stored in
memory, the slower it works. It can be shown, however, that the combinatio
n of assumptions about interconnected codes and oscillatory activation patt
erns (during processes such as encoding or retrieval) agrees well with the
law of temporal and spatial summation (at dendritic synapses) and predicts
(in the same way as physiological findings do) that activation processes ru
n the faster the more interconnected codes are stored in memory. It is conc
luded that even at a theoretical level a psychological model can be evaluat
ed by findings in neuroscience, provided that representational assumptions
are stated as explicitely as possible.