Intrinsic value and direct duties: From animal ethics towards environmental ethics?

Three types of concern for animal welfare are widely held: Animals should f eel well, they should function well, and they should lead natural lives. Th e paper deals with a well-known answer to the question of why such concerns are morally appropriate: Human beings have direct duties towards animals, because animals are beings that can flourish, the flourishing of animals is intrinsically or inherently valuable, and that which is conducive to their flourishing is a legitimate object of moral concern. Looking for a tenable conception of direct duties towards animals, the following questions are d iscussed: What should we take it to mean that "animal flourishing is intrin sically or inherently valuable?'' Under what conditions does a living being 's ability to flourish create direct duties towards this being? Is awarenes s or sentience required for there to be direct duties towards a living bein g? Does such a requirement imply that moral concerns for animals would be l imited to their feeling well, or does it also give way to having moral conc erns for their functioning well and leading natural lives? Can one take int o account considered judgements that claim that towards different animals w e have moral duties that differ in kind and/or strength? If environmental e thics cannot be based on the conception of direct duties here discussed, sh ould one draw a distinction between duties towards ourselves, our fellow hu man beings, or animals, and duties regarding plants, or collective entities such as populations, species, and ecosystems?