Analogies, adaptation, and anomalies

Authors
Citation
L. Samuelson, Analogies, adaptation, and anomalies, J ECON THEO, 97(2), 2001, pp. 320-366
Citations number
66
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN journal
00220531 → ACNP
Volume
97
Issue
2
Year of publication
2001
Pages
320 - 366
Database
ISI
SICI code
0022-0531(200104)97:2<320:AAAA>2.0.ZU;2-B
Abstract
This payer studies decision makers characterized by a stock of models, or a nalogies, who respond to strategic interactions by applying what appear to be the most suitable models: balancing the gains from more sophisticated de cisionmaking against the cost of placing heavier demands on scarce reasonin g resources. Equilibrium models will be finely tuned to interactions, leadi ng to seemingly "rational" behavior, when the interactions are sufficiently important and sufficiently distinct that a more generic model entails a pr ohibitive payoff reduction. Interactions that are infrequently encountered. relatively unimportant. or similar to other interactions may trigger seemi ngly inappropriate analogies. leading to behavioral anomalies. (C) 2001 Aca demic Press.