A neuropsychological and evolutionary approach to animal consciousness andanimal suffering

This paper will try to answer the question of whether animals can suffer. My aim is, firstly, to discuss whether or not an irreflexive animal conscio usness could experience suffering. I do this because there are authors who assume such a consciousness in animals. The second part of this contributio n concerns the question of the cognitive and neural prerequisites which hav e to be present in order to give consciousness, or the suffering experience , a positive fitness value. Further, I analyse for which animals these brai n structures and cognitive capacities have been described, since consciousn ess and suffering can only be expected in these animals. In order to answer the questions, several assumptions had to be made. If th e assumptions are correct than the results of the various analyses demonstr ate that: i) an irreflexive consciousness is unable to experience suffering ; and ii) animal suffering may, for the time being, only be expected in the anthropoid apes. However, there is an important difference between the reg istration of pain as a stimulus, which does not induce feelings of sufferin g, and the experience of pain as an emotion, which does induce suffering. A ccording to the arguments presented in this contribution, the experience of pain as a stimulus could be expected in far more species than anthropoid a pes alone.