Is voluntary government possible? A critique of constitutional economics

Citation
W. Block et Tj. Dilorenzo, Is voluntary government possible? A critique of constitutional economics, J I THEOR E, 156(4), 2000, pp. 567-582
Citations number
49
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT
ISSN journal
09324569 → ACNP
Volume
156
Issue
4
Year of publication
2000
Pages
567 - 582
Database
ISI
SICI code
0932-4569(200012)156:4<567:IVGPAC>2.0.ZU;2-D
Abstract
According to public choice theory, the market and the state are both device s through which cooperation is organized and made possible. This theme of v oluntary government is most prevalent in the subset of public choice known as constitutional economics. We believe that the analogy between politics a nd markets made by constitutional economists is theoretically weak and clou ds rather than enhances our understanding of political economy. Politics ha s very little in common with non-coercive, voluntary exchange in the market place.