Near rationality in a principal-agent framework

Authors
Sampson, AA Albertson, K
Citation
Aa. Sampson et K. Albertson, Near rationality in a principal-agent framework, J I THEOR E, 156(2), 2000, pp. 325-334
Citations number
11
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT
ISSN journal
09324569 → ACNP
Volume
156
Issue
2
Year of publication
2000
Pages
325 - 334
Database
ISI
SICI code
0932-4569(200006)156:2<325:NRIAPF>2.0.ZU;2-J
Abstract
An agent who is near-rational in the sense of Akerlof and Yellen makes a sl ight mistake which has only a first-order effect on his own utility. If he is constrained by a participation constraint on another party, as in a prin cipal-agent relationship, the result only holds when the agent is subject t o a truth-telling constraint.