The logic of congressional delegation: Explaining Argentine economic reform

This study evaluates the role played by the legislature in one of Argentina 's most important economic reforms of recent decades: the reform of tax inc entives for regional development. As implemented by the last military gover nment, this system of tax incentives provoked sharp distributive conflicts among provinces. Although a majority of legislators favored reform after th e return to democracy in 1983, interprovincial conflicts erupted bargaining problems that prevented the passage of reform legislation through regular channels. Pro-reform legislators decided instead to delegate reform authori ty to President Raul Alfonsin because he shared their interest in containin g the fiscal cost of tax incentives. Subsequent uses of this delegated auth ority by two presidents promoted the interests of the enacting coalition th at supported delegation. These findings support the usefulness of delegatio n models when carefully applied to Latin America and challenge theories tha t neglect the different ways that legislators shape Economic reform.