At any one time, a population is likely to contain individuals that are eit
her permanently incapable of cooperating or temporarily lack the time, ener
gy, or resources to allow them to act altruistically. These individuals hav
e been called "phenotypic defectors." Mie show that, rather than prevent co
operation from emerging, these individuals are extremely important to the s
tability of reciprocal altruism because they prevent the drift toward incre
asing naivete that is generally associated with highly cooperative environm
ents. By exploring a combination of simulation and analytical models, we de
monstrate that both permanent and transient phenotypic defectors readily pr
event the intermittent collapses of cooperation that have characterized the
majority of evolutionary simulations. The incorporation of this natural cl
ass of individuals not only suggests that the widespread "bang-bang" dynami
cs are a modeling artifact, but also highlights the need to reconsider the
types of cooperative strategy that we should expect to see in the natural w
orld.