German unification in 1989 raised the spectre of German hegemony in post-co
ld war Europe. In this article, I demonstrate that Germany lacks the struct
ural power consistent with European hegemony or dominance; that there is li
ttle evidence supporting an appreciable gap between Germany's structural po
wer and foreign policy ambitions; and that apparent symptoms of German hege
mony, particularly the process of institutional emulation in Central and Ea
stern Europe, reflect other international processes and incentives emanatin
g from the state system itself. This reassessment and downgrading of German
y's relative and absolute power resolve the paradox of German structural po
wer and German reluctance identified by others. But this alternative narrat
ive raises another more important question: why is Germany treated as a pot
ential or even aspiring hegemon in Europe? The answer to that question is l
ocated in the interconnected legacies of Auschwitz and the occupation regim
e. This joint legacy constitutes an important part of the historical contex
t within which we frame our assessments and judgements of German power; exp
lains the frequently unwarranted exaggeration acid suspicion of German powe
r; and demonstrates how the past can function as a powerful prism though wh
ich we interpret the intentions, ambitions and capabilities of a state.