In the past decade, political elites in Central and Eastern Europe have oft
en sought to imitate Western organizational and institutional models, while
organizations like the EU and NATO have often acted as "institutional tuto
rs" in the region. Using evidence from Hungary and the Czech Republic, this
paper demonstrates why imitating Western structures has been both administ
ratively Expedient and useful in building political coalitions. It also str
esses that the short-term benefits of doing so are followed by longer-term
costs. The paper answers four questions: How have certain models been held
tip to CEE elites? Why might some such models be targets for elites to imit
ate? How does such imitation occur? And what results from imitation? Contra
ry to expectations that institutional modeling would be merely technocratic
and used only early in the transformation, the paper's threefold heuristic
of templates, thresholds, and adjustments shows that the process is both p
olitically contentious and sustained.