Bureaucracies may set priorities for their workload in response to social g
oals or pressures from concentrated private interests. This paper explores
bureaucratic priorities empirically by studying Superfund, the federal prog
ram for cleaning up contaminated sites, It examines the amount of time that
sites on Superfund's National Priorities List require to complete three st
ages from listing to cleanup, using an econometric method for multiple sequ
ential durations. The empirical results provide little evidence that the En
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) prioritizes sites according to their ha
rms. By contrast, concentrated private interests, such as liable parties an
d local communities, play an important role in the EPA's priorities. Delays
caused by liable parties may reduce net benefits of cleanup by 8 percent.
This result suggests a benefit from funding provision of environmental qual
ity and other public goods through diffuse sources, such as broad-based tax
es, to avoid the detrimental effects of such concentrated interests.