Principles of fiscal federalism suggest that subnational units of gove
rnment should rely an benefits-received financing, implying regressivi
ty in state and local taxes. Empirically, however stares and their loc
alities vary enormously in the degree of progressivity of their tar sy
stems. This article investigates the effect of tax progressivity on ec
onomic growth. Using a pooled cross-section model from 1977 to 1993, t
he author found that the degree of progressivity has no effect on the
rate of growth of state personal income per capita. Measuring growth r
ates over the entire period the author found that progressivity has a
significant negative effect on economic growth. The long-period result
is driven by the high growth rates of a small number of northeastern
states, who benefited from strong regional growth and their tar haven
status adjacent to more progressive states. The weak progressivity eff
ect suggests that there is considerable scope for differences in tax i
ncidence across states.