Donald P. Green, Soo Yeon Kim, and David H. Yoon argue that many findings i
n quantitative international relations that use the dyad-year design are fl
awed. In particular, they argue that the effect of democracy on both trade
and conflict has been vastly overstated, that researchers have ignored unob
served heterogeneity between the various dyads, and that heterogeneity can
be best modeled by "fixed effects." that is, a model that includes a separa
te dummy for each dyad.
We argue that the use of fixed effects is almost always a bad idea for dyad
-year data with a binary dependent variable like conflict. This is because
conflict is a rare event, and the inclusion of fixed effects requires us to
not analyze dyads that never conflict. Thus while the 90 percent of dyads
that never conflict are more likely to be democratic, the use of fixed effe
cts gives democracy no credit for the lack of conflict in these dyads. Gree
n, Kim, and Yoon's fixed-effects logit can tell us little, if anything, abo
ut the pacific effects of democracy.
Their analysis of the impact of democracy on trade is also flawed. The incl
usion of fixed effects almost always masks the impact of slowly changing in
dependent variables; the democracy score is such a variable. Thus it is no
surprise that the inclusion of dyadic dummy variables in their model comple
tely masks the relationship between democracy and trade. We show that their
preferred fixed-effects specification does not outperform a model with no
effects (when that model is correctly specified in other ways). Thus there
is no need to include the masking fixed effects, and so Green, Kim, and Yoo
n's findings do not overturn previous work that found that democracy enhanc
ed trade.
We agree with Green, Kim, and Yoon that modeling heterogeneity in time-seri
es cross-section data is important. We mention a number of alternatives to
their fixed-effects approach, none of which would have the pernicious conse
quences of using dyadic dummies in their two reanalyses.