Rights-based management regimes are considered by economists as an importan
t solution to the problems of excess capacity and biological over-harvestin
g of fisheries. In practice, adoption of such regimes, and particularly of
those relying on individual quota allocations, has often met with resistanc
e from within the fisheries concerned. A key reason for this resistance app
ears to be the distributional conflicts which arise in the process of imple
menting the regimes. An economic analysis of the nature of these conflicts
in the different contexts in which they have been observed is proposed. The
approach centres on the way in which distributional conflicts can influenc
e the operation of management systems and their impacts on fisheries, from
the country to the individual firm level. As an illustration, an analysis o
f the economic processes at firm level is developed based on the simulation
of a fishery managed under individual transferable quotas. (C) 2001 Elsevi
er Science Ltd. All rights reserved.