We present and study a Minority Game based model of a financial market wher
e adaptive agents-the speculators-interact with deterministic agents-called
producers. Speculators trade only if they detect predictable patterns whic
h grant them a positive gain. Indeed the average number of active speculato
rs grows with the amount of information that producers inject into the mark
et. Transitions between equilibrium and out of equilibrium behavior are obs
erved when the relative number of speculators to the complexity of informat
ion or to the number of producers are changed. When the system is out of eq
uilibrium, stylized facts arise, such as fat tailed distribution of returns
and volatility clustering. Without speculators, the price follows a random
walk; this implies that stylized facts arise because of the presence of sp
eculators. Furthermore, if speculators abandon price taking behavior, styli
zed facts disappear. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.