Virtual legality - Authoritarian legacies and the reform of military justice in Brazil, the southern cone, and Mexico

Authoritarian regimes in Latin America frequently expanded military court j urisdiction to prosecute political opponents and protect members of the arm ed forces and police engaged in repression. What happened to the military c ourts after the recent transitions to democracy in the region? Why did some democratic transitions produce broad reform of military justice while most did not? This article first reviews contending theoretical explanations th at offer answers to these questions, comparing those answers with actual ou tcomes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. It then argues that the "mo de of transition" perspective, which attributes variation in the extent of military justice reform to the autonomy and strength of the military in the democratic transition, best explains the outcomes in these cases. However, the military's autonomy and strength should be specified. In the area of m ilitary justice, the relevant factors are the military's propagation of an accepted legal justification for past uses of military courts and the creat ion of congressional support for the maintenance of existing military court jurisdiction. Both of these factors are present in Brazil, Chile, and Mexi co, where little or no reform of military justice took place under democrat ization, and absent in Argentina, where broad reform did occur.